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Introduction
Women have been prominent in show business long before feminist and
gender equality movements. However, in contrast to all other areas of enter-
tainment women are still very much in the minority within stand-up comedy.
Why is this so? Is it to do with the patriarchal nature of the industry? Or is it
that women just aren't funny? I aim to argue that it is not by choice or accident
that few female comics succeed within the industry but more to do with the
hurdles and boundaries they have to cross that their male counterparts do not
by overcoming engrained stereotyping. I will give a detailed and yet broad
cultural and historical context on the gender roles within stand up comedy. I
plan to examine the extent gender-roles define a women's place in stand-up
and the effects the feminist movement has had on the stereotypes of comedi-
ennes. I will also attempt to illuminate the social, political, and cultural implica-
tions of gender and power within popular entertainment, analysing the means
by which we construct, contest and negotiate female comics performing their
gender on stage. With case studies including Mock The Week (2005), the
stand-up comic Bridget Christie and interviews with female stand-ups current-
ly on the open-mic circuit.
The importance of asking this question is highlighted by Barreca (1988) who
maintains: `Feminist criticism has generally avoided the discussion of comedy,
perhaps in order to be accepted by conservative critics who found feminist
theory comic in and of itself'. Scholars like Gilbert (1962) have recently begun
to point out that `female comic performance provides a unique and compelling
template upon which to explore the relationship between gender and power in
contemporary culture.' This investigation aims to illuminate some of these
issues throughout history and the current perceptions of female comics both
on the open-mic circuit and within the professional comedy industries today.
`Oestrogen and laughter are apparently not contra-indicated'
(Steele, 2013)
1 Chapter
One
1.1
General and Gendered Theories of Humour
Although there is an increasing body of new literature and research of the
analysis and psychological developments of women's humour, the theorists
working within these fields have not yet fully unified their findings into coher-
ent and integrated conclusions. These emerging theories illuminate some of
the discrepancies noted by humour theorists between men and women's use
of humour. Naranjo-Huebl contends that through these new models of psy-
chological development, a pattern has emerged revealing that women's
humour `follows the same patterns of communication used by women to
address conflict, or in terms of humour theory, incongruity, without damaging
interpersonal relations' (1995:1). Due to the fact that earlier models of psycho-
logical development have largely overlooked the aspects of women's experi-
ence, it is to be expected that these previous theories of women's use of
humour include some weaknesses and inaccuracies. To gain an understand-
ing of the differing responses men and women have towards their decoding of
comic material it is necessary to analyse these predominating theories of
humour in a more general context. Although these are basic theories of
humour, this understanding can allow one to turn our focus back to the topic
of women's humour in particular. Because most of our meanings are generat-
ed by difference, it is perhaps most easily identified when contrasting it to
these general theories of men's humour.
The three primary theories under which most theorists' views can be catego-
rised are that of: superiority theories, repression and release theories, and
incongruity theories. Thomas Hobbes is usually credited with the first articula-
tion of superiority theory he claimed that laughter was associated with the
glorification of the self, usually at the expense of someone else. In Leviathan
(1651), Hobbes stated that we laugh in the moment of realisation that our own
superiority is recognised by its own virtue or by the virtue of other's shortcom-
ings.
Sudden Glory, is the passion which maketh those Grimaces called
LAUGHTER: and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that
pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.
(1968:125)
As well as believing laughing at others' limitations makes one feel superior,
Hobbes also held the notion that people with more limitations will laugh more
often. Hobbes's theory works well within a self-deprecatory humour frame-
work, although as Lawrence La Fave (1976:65) illustrated when writing "this
egocentric, competitive interpretation of superiority humour theory, the indi-
vidual is amused only when he feels triumphant and/or another person looks
bad in comparison with himself", it cannot account for all that people find
amusing. La Fave cites studies that have revealed not everyone finds dispar-
aging humour funny. Members of social groups that have been subjected to
some kind of social discrimination find humour directed at other victimised
groups less funny than people who have not experienced discrimination
based upon their social identity. In addition, it can be found that not all individ-
uals sharing an ethnic identity will find jokes directed at their minorities as
`unfunny'. Nonetheless, the psychological nature of Hobbes's theory that
laughter stems from a `glorification' of the self, suggests humour plays a large
role in establishing ones identity and rebuffing perceived threats to that
identity. With this comprehension, superiority theory (in a diluted form) can be
analysed in terms of psychological theories of humour that claim we engage
in humour that validates our personal and collective identities. Because
domination plays an elementary and integral role in the protection of our
identities, humour therefore will also inevitably play a primary role within
methods of power and control. Humour can be utilised as a tool in maintaining
and establishing domination in the service of the self-preservation and protec-
tion of the ego.
This inclusion of the ego introduces the Freudian realm of repression and
release theories. Sigmund Freud (1931:243-258) argued that aggressive and
sexual drives, necessary for survival, are repressed in their socially unac-
ceptable form by the ego. Humour, therefore, provides a socially acceptable
form for this release of repressed psychic energy (Goldstein & McGhee,
1972:13). Similar to that of the superiority theory, this model contends that
humour serves the ego as a defence mechanism rather than an offensive tool.
As a consequence Freudian theorists on humour tend to analyse humour in
terms of the revelations it provides about the psyche of the comedian, as
opposed to how it might be used as a strategic means of control. Sexual jokes
reveal an individual's repressed sex drive and disparaging jokes are seen as
examples of aggression or fear toward certain groups or individuals.
The notion of incongruity as a primary element of humour has ancient roots.
Incongruity theories focus on similarity and dissimilarity and how, in the
presence of other factors such as perception of harmlessness / surprise or
suddenness, they evoke a laughter response (Nerhardt, 1976:55). The 18
th
century philosophers Joseph Addison and David Harley rehashed earlier
theories and contended that `resemblance and opposition' are integral ingre-
dients to humour. According to most incongruity theorists, humour occurs
when two distinct logic patterns or models of thought unexpectedly collide. In
terms of a language approach, G.B Milner's (1982:27) semiotic analysis of
laughter asserts that `The stimulus to laughter consists of the collision of two
normally quite distinct universes of discourse within a single context.' For
example, when words converge, we have puns or malaprops; and when
sentence structures collide we have spoonerisms. We laugh when we recog-
nise new differential relations (Naranjo-Huebl, 1995). According to Milner
(1982:27), behind these unexpected reversals `stands the human tension
between nature and culture, deeply rooted in the unconscious.' In 1900, Henri
Bergson (1911:27) contended the same notion: `A situation is invariably comic
when it belongs simultaneously to two altogether independent series of events
and is capable of being interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the
same time.' Incongruity, as Norman Holland (1982:22) states, can take
numerous forms. Cognitive incongruity occurring when `something affirms and
denies the same proposition simultaneously, when something creates disor-
der and then resolves that disorder, when something shows the limitations of
the real word as a way to affirm the logical order of some other, ideal plane.'
Ethical incongruity involves our sense of values, as Naranjo-Heubl (1995)
argues `the contrast between good and evil, the noble and the contemptible,
the high and the low, the beautiful and the disgusting.' Formal incongruity
involves defects of forms `Something harmful presented harmlessly,' the
tragic or harrowing presented as painless, something of little consequence
delivered as something of great value, or vice versa. German theorist Theodor
Lipps (1903:575) talked about the comic nature of `that little thing which
behaves as though it were a big one, that swells itself to do it, that plays the
role of a big thing and then behaves again like a little thing or melts into
something insignificant.'
Early twentieth-century theorists of humour, including Bergson and Freud
(1911a, 1931b) further pointed out that incongruity should be followed by
resolution to truly maximise humour and take the mere level of `nonsense'
forward to the accolade of being called a `joke'. According to the model of
incongruity/resolution, humour comes from a gap between what is expected
and what actually occurs, concluding with understanding, or resolution, of the
incongruity. Several theorists discuss the importance of the presence of a
feeling of play that makes humour possible, an affirmation that there is no
danger to one's person or existing schemas (Rothbart, 1976). Resolution of
the incongruity signifies its nonthreatening nature and restores order. When
digesting humour in this capacity, one can construe humour as ultimately a
form of social control in the respect that social structures, although initially
challenged are eventually reinforced. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in
mind that the perception of incongruity, safety and resolution is always going
to be highly subjective to the audience in question.
Mary Rothbart (1976:38) has contended that individual responses to incongru-
ity vary widely and may preclude the offered resolution different people find
different stimuli more or less incongruous. The ambiguity presented must first
be recognised by the hearer and this recognition remains dependant upon the
person's cultural and personal life experience. Bruère and Beard (1934), in
their anthology of women's humour, acknowledged women's contrasting
paradigms and their differences to that of the male world: `The angle of vision
from which women see a lack of balance, wrong proportion, disharmonies,
and incongruities in life is a thing of their world as it must be a world always
a little apart'
To engage in the history of women in comedy is to rake up a history of
hostility. A prime instance of this being the denial of a woman's right to vote
for over 140 years - a perfect example of incongruity in a historical context
this law being upheld in a nation based on the moral foundations of equality of
all people. This has not gone unnoticed by almost all of the humourists in
Bruère and Beard's anthology. A society that supported political, economic
and social equality in principle but denied enfranchisement to over half the
members of its population exuded incongruity and provided an unlimited
source of material for women in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to
condemn and mock.
Alice Duer Miller, an author of satiric novels, short stories and verse, as well
as a columnist for the New York Tribune from 1914 to 1917, composed an
introduction to her first column under the title of `Are Women People?' which
includes a dialogue between a father and son that emphasises the longstand-
ing contradiction of woman's disfranchisement:
Father, what is a Legislature?
A representative body elected by the people of the state.
Are women people?
No my son, criminals, lunatics and women are not people.
Do legislators legislate for nothing?
Oh, no; they are paid a salary.
By whom?
By the people.
Are women people?
Of course, my son, just as much as men are.
(1988:203-205).
Miller returned to the subject numerous times in her column, and once high-
lighted the incongruities of the argument by turning the argument on its head:
Why We Oppose Votes for Men
1. Because a man's place is in the armoury.
2. Because no really manly man wants to settle any question otherwise than
by fighting about it.
3. Because if men should adopt peaceable methods women will no longer
look up to them.
4. Because men will lost their charm if they step out of their natural sphere
and interest themselves in other matters than feats of arms, uniforms, and
drums.
5. Because men are too emotional to vote. Their conduct at baseball games
and political conventions shows this, while their innate tendency to appeal
to force renders them peculiarly unfit for the task of government.
(1988:22)
While these ideas are largely out-dated and laughable in today's modern
British society it is not to say that incongruities in the perception of gender
roles and the devaluation of the female are a thing of the past. Those women
that have theorised on women's humour have almost always had to address
the negative stereotyping of women's lack of a sense of humour. Kat Sanborn
(1885) in her anthology of female humourists, The Wit of Women, lays claim
to the motive of her work was a means to challenge this stereotypical asser-
tion. In her introduction, Sanborn disregards these preconceptions, instead
discussing the plethora of excellent writings and her predicament to be
selective when compiling the anthology. Perhaps her lack of address to this
issue prompted her to revisit the topic in her 1905 article entitled `New Eng-
land Women Humorists', within the piece she admits that the stereotype of the
humourless woman has persisted. Close to a century later, Robin Lakoff, in
her 1975 study on `women's language' confirmed the common cultural per-
ception: `[I]t is axiomatic in middle-class American society that, first, women
can't tell jokes- they are bound to ruin the punch line, they mix up the order of
things, and so on. Moreover, they don't `get' jokes. In short, women have no
sense of humour.'
The dedicated scholars exploring and documenting the preservation of
women's humour - including the works of Regina Barreca , Nancy Walker and
Zita Dresner (1988abc) to name but a few - have compiled sophisticated
anthologies and bodies of theory investigating, identifying and combatting
these negative stereotypes. A study of their responses to these questions
reveals three primary explanations to these accusations. The first explanation
relates back to Lakoff's (1975) observations on women's employment of
language: women have been discouraged from using humour in public
situations just as expressing themselves in general has been restricted. Lakoff
and Regina Barreca (1988) note that humour, particular disparaging humour,
is not considered as `polite', and historically women have been brought up to
avoid any instances of impoliteness. In addition, much humour is candidly
aggressive, and women have been discouraged, throughout the course of
history, from exhibiting signs of aggression in any form. In her cross-cultural
study on social anthropology, Mahadev Apte (1985) states:
The use of humor to compete with or to belittle others, thereby enhancing a
person's own status, or to humiliate others either psychologically or physical-
ly, seems generally absent among women. Thus the most commonly institu-
tionalized ways of engaging in such humour, namely, verbal duels, ritual in-
sults, and practical jokes and pranks, are rarely reported for women.
(1985:50)
Therefore many cultures, in past and present, discourage women from
participating in disparaging forms of humour.
The second reason theorised as to why this stereotype persists is that of the
censorship or misinterpretation of women's humour. In this scenario, women
do not lack a sense of humour; but their humour goes unrecognised or
ignored. This censoring and misinterpretation of women's humour is some-
what recognised in the anthologies compiled by the scholars mentioned
above. As of the selective nature of these collections, many works of humour-
ists have been omitted the publishers and academics, given the almighty
task of handing down the greatest wits of women from the written world for
further generations to study - cannot fathomably include every great work of
humour. Therefore the legacy of humour left by our foremothers is not largely
in circulation compared to many other areas of academia and publication.
Included within this censorship and misinterpretation of women's humour are
faulty research methods that favour towards the male forms of humour,
making women's sense of humour appear to lack development. Closer
examination of the studies often reveals serious methodological flaws, as
Mary Crawford (1992:24) highlights when pointing out that such experiments
use humorous stimuli that reflect masculinist and androcentric values with the
results being used to `probe' that men are funnier than women. Naranjo-Huebl
(1995) succinctly summarises a prime example of this biased favouring with
her articulation of Cox, Read and Van Auken's (1990:288) study. In which a
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- , 2015, Do I Look Funny In This? An investigation into the perception and representation of female comedians on the stand-up circuit and their audiences, Hamburg, Bedey Media GmbH, https://www.anchor-publishing.com/document/312802
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