Shopping cart
0 Items | US$ 0.00
5
Introduction
The debate over the importance of absolute and relative gains in political
decision-making remains a central point of contention in IR Theory.
1
In essence, the
debate revolves around the question of whether states seek comparative gains over
international rivals by enhancing their security and power relative to others (neo-
realism), or whether they are instead primarily concerned with achieving 'absolute
gains' through first increasing their own domestic wealth and power (neo-
liberalism). Whereas neo-realists and neo-liberalists accordingly disagree over
states' natural preferences, there nevertheless exists some consensus in that the
anarchic environment of an international self-help system often compels states to
prioritize relative gains, regardless of which type of gain they might have originally
favoured. As this paper will argue, however, the historical record does not support
the conclusion that a concern for relative gains inevitably follows from international
anarchy.
2
Instead absolute gains-considerations might just as well inform the
decision-making process of individual actors, given that the degree to which they
pursue relative or absolute advantages is not an immutable feature of anarchy but, as
social-constructivism would submit, ultimately determined by states' distinctive
national identities and interests, in particular by how policy-makers themselves
define the contents of their national interests according to their strategic
surroundings. Hence analytical focus should move away from treating the issue of
relative vs. absolute gains merely as an either/or matter and assign greater
importance to how actors themselves perceive their national interest to be best
served through absolute or relative gains.
1
Major works in the debate include: Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in
World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert Powell, "Absolute and
Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85:4
(December, 1991), pp. 1303-1320; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The
neorealist-neoliberal debate," International Organization, Vol. 48:2 (Spring, 1994), pp. 313-344; Joseph
M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42: 3 (Summer, 1988), pp. 485-507; Joseph M.
Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University, 1990); Duncan Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation,"
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85:3 (September, 1991), pp. 701-726; John C. Matthews III,
"Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter," International Security,
Vol. 21:1 (Summer, 1996), pp. 112-146; David L. Rousseau, "Motivations for Choice: The Salience of
Relative Gains in International Politics," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 46:3 (June, 2002), pp. 394-
426.
2
In IR Theory, "Anarchy" refers to the absence of an overarching authority or central governing body
invested with the supreme power to universally enforce agreements and settle disputes between individual
nation-states. For definitions of the term "Anarchy", see in particular: Oliver Daddow, International
Relations Theory: The Essentials (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2013), p. 66.
6
By demonstrating the primacy of absolute gains in the United States' decision
to employ nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it will be shown that
monocausal approaches to statesmen's underlying reasoning and motivations are
altogether inadequate for conclusively establishing whether their decisions are
guided more by absolute or relative gains-concerns.
3
Rather than concentrating on
only one particular area, e.g. military objectives or economic profit, such primary
level factors need to be incorporated into a profounder secondary level analysis
which not only examines the entire scope and extent of states' foreign-policy
agenda, but also the close interaction between domestic and international
determinants. This, in turn, will require a broadening of the terms absolute and
relative gains by not only identifying comparative gains or individual pay-offs, but
also ideational, ideological and/or organizational objectives as the mainsprings of
political decision-making.
Accordingly, American leaders in 1945 were interested in the pursuit of
decidedly absolute gains that would help them perpetuate their country's long-term
economic prosperity and national security. The instruments for achieving these ends
were seen to reside mainly in the swift accomplishment of such absolute objectives
as 1.) socio-economic recovery at home and overseas, 2.) obtaining greater political
freedom for addressing pressing problems in world affairs, and 3.) establishing the
structural and institutional foundations of a global order more conducive to
sustained world peace and progressive international relations. As such, these points
were not only functionally interdependent, but they all also presupposed a prompt
and satisfactory termination of America's military engagement with Imperial Japan.
3
On the inadequacies of monocausality in theorizing international relations, see John G. Ruggie, "The
Past as Prologue?: Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 21:4
(Spring, 1997), pp. 124-125.
7
In order to substantiate those observations, Part I will set out the theoretical
framework by first revisiting neo-realist and neo-liberal views on absolute and relative
gains. Following this, social-constructivist theories will be applied to amend their
analytical deficiencies and offer a different perspective on that particular issue. Part II
consists of the aforementioned historical case study, beginning with a survey of
contending primary level motivations attributed to the Truman Administration for using
nuclear weapons. A broader secondary level analysis will thereafter supplement the
incomplete insights thus gained by integrating the atomic bombings into the wider
historical context of the United States' national and international policies of the time.
Drawing on extensive primary source material (e.g. unclassified government
documents; minutes of cabinet meetings; memoranda, public statements, memoirs,
etc...) and secondary literature of a much larger scope than those accounts exploring but
the more immediate military or diplomatic circumstances in relation to Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, Part III will then eventually synthesize earlier findings into a coherent
reformulation of the absolute/relative gains-problematic in IR Theory.
9
I.
Theoretical Framework
1.1.
Neo-realist and Neo-liberal Views
The terms relative and absolute gains are often employed by IR scholars as two
discrete analytical categories characterized more by their inherent dichotomy than the
possible interrelation of their underlying propositions. Thus neo-liberalism assumes states to
share a natural preference for absolute or individual gains in their interactions with other
nations, independent of those achieved by others.
4
More specifically, they are above all
interested in enhancing their own national power, prosperity and well-being, leading them
to consider matters of international import in "strictly individualistic terms" so as to ensure
their own highest possible payoff.
5
As Jospeh Grieco succinctly recapitulated that position,
neo-liberalism essentially expects states to "calculate costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action in order to maximize their utility in view of [their own] preferences."
6
These views sharply contrast with those put forward by neo-realism or structural
realism. Particularly, neo-realists contend that states' primary objective is "not to attain the
highest possible individual gain or payoff, [but] to prevent others from achieving advances
in their relative capabilities."
7
Accordingly, Kenneth Waltz argued that since nation-states
want to maintain their relative position within the international system in order to improve
their security and thus ensure their survival, it is only once the latter has been assured that
they can turn to "such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power."
8
Although offensive
realists part with defensive neo-realism in that they regard power maximization as the main
driving force in international politics, they likewise assert that relative gains-concerns
ultimately outweigh absolute gains-considerations in actors' political thinking.
9
Hence both
branches of neo-realism hold that states first examine the effects of their decisions on their
relative position vis-à-vis international rivals, and thus essentially only thereafter their
impact on domestic and/or socio-economic matters (absolute gains).
10
4
Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 27.
5
Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, pp. 34-36.
6
Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 35; Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 27.
7
Grieco, Cooperation among Nations, p. 39.
8
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 126.
9
John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company,
2001), p. 83. See also Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?",
Security Studies, Vol. 5:3 (Spring, 1996), p. 101.
10
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 105; Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 58.
10
While neo-liberalists typically stress the salience of absolute gains, neo-realists
do, however, by no means underestimate the value of absolute capabilities for states'
security, survival and/or power accumulation.
11
Yet in contrast to neo-liberalism, they
believe that concerns over absolute gains alone are altogether insufficient in accounting
for states' behaviour in international relations. Consequently, they not only add, but also
attach greater significance to relative gains-considerations in their analysis.
12
Although
the realist contention that political units invariably favour relative over absolute gains is
certainly disputable-
and ultimately untenable as a general assumption about states'
preferences in any strategic situation
, the neoliberal notion that states are insensitive
to how they fare in relation to other nations appears even less plausible. After all, it is
unreasonable to suppose that states are unconcerned about balance of power-relations or
others' offensive capabilities even as they themselves are seeking to enhance their
position within the international system.
In any event, however, it is premature to trace such a presumed sensitivity to
absolute or relative gains to states' a priori preferences for them. Instead the latter must
be seen as a direct function of their specific strategic environment.
13
In so doing, Robert
Powell may be right that the competitive nature of the international system imposes
severe structural constraints on states' activities, causing any desire at augmenting their
absolute capabilities to often give way to more acute concerns over relative gains.
14
Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to infer from that reality that states' international
surroundings will by default compel them to prioritize relative over absolute
advantages. Relative gains-concerns undeniably play an important, arguably even pre-
eminent role in the reasoning of individual policy-makers. Anarchy and the constant
fear for their survival, notably how the latter might be jeopardized by the offensive
actions of other units, after all constitute a major cause of anxiety in international
politics. Still, anarchy alone does not prompt states to develop a preference for
comparative gains;
15
nor will the pursuit of power and security perforce cause them to
favour relative advantages.
16
11
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 109-110.
12
Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 487, 500.
13
Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 335-338.
14
Ibid; see also Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains," pp. 1303-1320.
15
Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 337.
16
cf. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International
Security, Vol. 15:1 (Summer, 1990), p. 12, 44-45.
11
Yet such a rationale is implicit in neo-realist thought. Although prominent
scholars such as John Mearsheimer agree that absolute considerations are important to
political actors as well, they nevertheless dispute the neo-liberal contention that states
are mainly driven by such concerns, given that anarchy after all guarantees security to
be scarce and will therefore heighten "states' concerns about relative gains."
17
However,
that view betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the very essence of power and
national gains in inter-state relationships as Jack Donnelly has conclusively shown.
18
In
particular, the mere fact that states are evidently much concerned about their relative
position must not be taken to signify that decision-makers will as a result invariably
think of national gains in relative rather than absolute terms. After all, both power and
security are inherently contingent on the development, increase and sustainability of
decidedly absolute capabilities, notably economic prosperity and political
independence.
19
Therefore, as Donnelly concludes, "the fact that power is relative does
not necessarily lead states to pursue relative gains."
20
Moreover, states
or rather the
individuals in charge of their foreign policy
may well differ over how much
importance is to be assigned to the acquisition of either absolute or relative gains. For
even though their preferences may indeed be shaped by their strategic environment, it
nevertheless does not follow that states are supposedly all functionally alike in their
approach to world affairs.
21
Put differently, it is not only a question of how the
international system bears upon states' general attitude to relative and absolute
advantages, but rather also of how actors essentially judge themselves that system to be
one in which their national interests are best served by absolute or relative gains.
Importantly, however, these two categories of national gains never exist entirely
independent of each other. More specifically, concern for relative advantages has been
demonstrated to often stand in direct relation to the furtherance of a long-term absolute
objective as well.
22
Thus even neo-realists have conceded that states' inclination to
worry over the relative distribution of material capabilities ultimately derives from their
concern over "absolute losses", i.e. how a division of gains might empower rival nations
17
Ibid, pp. 44-45.
18
Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, pp. 58-63.
19
Ibid, pp. 60-61.
20
Ibid, p. 61.
21
See Robert 0. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," in: Robert O. Keohane
(ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 14.
22
Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, p. 60.
12
to develop the capacity for threatening their own security.
23
Thus relative advantages
not only constitute the best avenue for maximizing their security, but also for guarding
against absolute losses following a disproportionate increase in the power of other
nations.
Whereas neo-realism accordingly does not deny that relative gains might serve
the accomplishment of an overriding absolute objective,
24
it still clearly emphasises the
structural limits imposed by international anarchy on states' unhindered pursuit of such
absolute gains. More specifically, it argues that since "the anarchic environment of
international politics compels states to be concerned at all times with survival," this
"requires that they supplant [...] absolute welfare maximization with the instrumental
goal of relative resource maximization."
25
In short, absolute gains may well figure as the
ultimate objective and/or logical preference of states, yet intense security fears
nevertheless often lead them to attach greater value to their relative position. Even
though relative gains might thus indeed be all about securing absolute gains or averting
absolute losses, it is either way a concern for relative capacities that frequently shapes
state relations in international politics.
1.2.
Absolute Gains via Absolute Objectives
That particular view, however, is ultimately incomplete. For although
competition over relative advantages is without doubt a central feature of international
relations, that fact alone does not warrant the assumption that anarchy inevitably causes
states to first consider their relative share of power within the international system.
While it is reasonable to suppose states' preoccupation with relative gains to issue from
the latter's effects on their long-term absolute capabilities,
26
there has been given little
attention to how states might ultimately not only seek to enhance their absolute position via
relative advantages over their international competitors, but instead through the realization
of a distinctly absolute gain as well. Consequently, it has become the norm in IR Theory to
regard relative gains as states' principal instrument for ensuring or preventing absolute
gains/losses. Yet in so doing, an important aspect of state behaviour has been left only
23
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 105.
24
Snidal, "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation," p. 704; Matthews, "Current
Gains and Future Outcomes," p. 120.
25
Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal
Debate," World Politics, Vol. 46:2 (January, 1994), pp. 212-213.
26
Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, p. 60.
13
insufficiently explored, to the extent that absolute gains are almost exclusively conceived of
as a national end to be achieved through relative advantages, rather than being seen
themselves as a means to improve both a country's absolute and relative position. As a
result, such a limited perspective offers an inchoate understanding of the basic reasoning,
motivations and decision-making processes behind states' foreign-policy activities. In
particular, it is an analytical fallacy to assume that states are either naturally predisposed to
relative gains or that their strategic environment will invariably force them to replace their
initial concern at absolute gains-maximization with more pronounced considerations in
regard to the relative distribution of material capabilities. In reality, absolute gains may well
be assigned an equally pivotal significance by individual policy-makers. Not only for the
sake of obtaining an absolute gain in its own right, but rather because it are likewise
absolute and not relative gains which they might altogether judge most expedient to
advancing their country's over-all interests and well-being-
both in present absolute as
well as in future absolute and relative terms.
14
True, Grieco may be right that states are interested in "achieving and maintaining
relative capabilities sufficient to remain secure and independent in the self-help context of
international anarchy."
27
However, there is no conclusive empirical, much less historical
basis for presuming that states will attempt to remain secure and independent through only
focusing on their relative as opposed to their absolute capabilities. Instead states might
consider a marked increase of their absolute power
not just military, but economic as
well
to ultimately represent the most practical approach in their concurrent quest for
security. In that regard, it simply makes no sense to expect that states will pursue wealth and
prosperity only once the overriding goal of national security has been met. This is not to say
that policy-makers will value the former more than the latter, but only that they might view
them as two equally important objectives, especially since the realization of such an
absolute goal might after all be seen as the most beneficial tool for guaranteeing their long-
term security as well.
Naturally, such a potential preference for absolute gains does not mean that
states will worry less about comparative advantages as neo-liberalists once
asserted.
28
In this respect, neo-realists were arguably closer to the truth by
maintaining that in addition to their individual gains, states must also include the
relative advantages made by other nations into their utility function.
29
Importantly,
however, the fact that decision-makers appraise their competitors' payoffs does not
imply that they will seek to augment their own capabilities through relative gains
alone. As Powell remarked, the extent to which states pursue relative gains is after
all inextricably related to their strategic environment, so that it will vary "from
situation to situation."
30
Therefore a concern for relative gains should not be
assumed a standard feature of states' decision-making processes, but rather be
interpreted as something that ultimately only develops as a function of their specific
international environment. For while in a self-help world such a propensity for
relative capabilities might indeed sooner or later take precedence, states might
nevertheless still find some virtue in the idea of first giving priority to the pursuit of
27
Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limitations of
Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory," in: David Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 303.
28
Some key proponents of that school of thought, notably Robert Keohane, have since self-critically re-
examined and amended that position themselves
.
Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the
Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in: David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The
Contemporary Debate (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 292.
29
Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 500.
30
Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 336.
15
absolute gains. At the very least, they might conclude that relative advantages do not
represent the only strategy for safeguarding their survival and well-being, but that
absolute gains might actually prove just as effective towards that end.
In that context, a seminal question arising from the above discussion inevitably
pertains to the exact circumstances and conditions under which a preference for either
absolute or relative gains might ultimately be formed. As Robert Jervis noted, however, that
area is presently still in need of a more factual investigation and analysis, given that
research has thus far largely been carried out only "at the level of theory and prescription,
with much less attention to when decision-makers do in fact exhibit relative gains-
concerns."
31
Yet if the dynamics determining actors' decisions to secure relative gains have
only been insufficiently covered, the same is even more true with regard to the
circumstances that might prompt them to prioritize absolute goals. More than that, it is often
not even appreciated to begin with that absolute gains-considerations might likewise be of
paramount importance in their relations to other nations. That absolute gains do matter in
many critical and defining a situation, however, therefore constitutes one particularly
relevant aspect of states' decision-making which this paper will attempt to illustrate in a
more detailed and exhaustive manner.
1.3.
Social-constructivism
By shifting analytical focus to absolute rather than (merely) relative gains-
considerations, social-constructivism provides an especially useful and instructive
approach to such fundamental questions as why or when states will confer greater
importance to absolute gains in their foreign affairs.
32
In so doing, however, core neo-
realist assumptions about the nature and distinctive characteristics of the international
system need not necessarily be invalidated in terms of their explanatory power and
contributions to the study of International Relations. Accordingly, social-constructivism
does not per se dispute the neo-realist contention that states are goal-driven entities
31
Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," International
Security, Vol. 24:1 (Summer, 1999), p. 47; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation,"
World Politics, Vol. 40:3 (April, 1988), p. 335.
32
Major constructivist publications include: Nicholas Onuf, World of our Making: Rules and Rule in
Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989);
Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,"
International Organization, Vol. 46:2 (Spring, 1992), pp. 391-425; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of
International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Martha Finnemore, National
Interests in International Society (New York, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Maja Zehfuss,
Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002).
16
concerned above all else with their own survival and well-being.
33
Likewise, it cannot
be denied that fears over how the latter might be compromised by the relative
advantages of international rivals often causes states to protect their position at the
expense of others.
34
Contrary to established neo-realist thought, however, social-
constructivism would argue that the mere fact that states compete in a self-help world
does not in and of itself induce a preference for relative gains. The reason for this is that
the national identities and interests from which states' concerns for absolute and/or
relative gains derive are not irreversibly given, but rather subject to constant change and
internal revision.
35
Thus simply because states have throughout most of human history
acted in a selfish manner does not mean that they are bound to do so in future
interactions as well.
36
Yet even if one accepts states to have a largely egoistic identity, this likewise
does not indicate that they are only able to conceive of their interests in relative terms.
Just as identities are not stable, neither are state interests totally 'immune' to ideational
transformation and reformulation, notably since they are after all first and foremost a
'matter of interpretation'.
37
Hence although survival, security, wealth, independence, etc.
will arguably always form the main objectives of states in international politics, the
means and ways which they determine most suitable to accomplishing these ends may
nevertheless considerably vary from state to state and period to period.
38
Put differently,
states are very well capable of 'constructing' their interests to include different scenarios
and avenues by which to realize them, a process which as such may be said of
constituting but the natural corollary of their distinctive national identity and the way
33
Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations, p. 36; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 91-93; John J.
Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19:3 (Winter,
1994-1995), p. 11.
34
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 105. See also Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity,"
International Organization, Vol. 49:2 (Spring, 1995), p. 231.
35
Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," pp. 231-233; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 21.
36
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 238-243, 314, 363-364. For a detailed discussion of
structural change and collective identity in international relations, see Wendt, Chapter 7, pp. 313-369.
Martha Finnemore has also produced a particularly revealing study on the transformative nature of state
interest. Martha Finnemore, National interests in International Society (New York, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1996).
37
Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interest," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2:3
(September, 1996), p. 279.
38
This is one area where constructivists differ among themselves about the dynamics of interest
formation. Thus whereas Alexander Wendt sees the latter primarily as the result of inter-subjective
interaction, Jutta Weldes attaches somewhat greater significance to the cultural and historical contexts in
which individual state identities and interests are shaped. See Weldes, "Constructing National Interest," p.
280.
17
they see themselves in relation to other nations.
39
From this it follows that absolute
gains might be given preeminent significance if policy-makers essentially believe
themselves that such absolute goals will ultimately best serve their nation's over-all
security and prosperity. Relative gains might still matter greatly, but it are absolute
capabilities, not shifts in the comparative advantages among nations, which states might
then regard as the most expedient instrument for securing their most vital interests.
As noted earlier, state interests do not exist outside the wider social environment
in which actors operate. Specifically, as Alexander Wendt observed, "actors do not have
a `portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead,
they define their interests in the process of defining situations."
40
Since states are
strongly influenced by their social interactions with other nations, their interests as well
as the methods for realizing them are likewise constituted in direct response to the
structural constraints and demands imposed on them by their international
surroundings.
41
It is that fundamental process of interest formation which is key to
understanding why states might favour relative or absolute gains in their relationships
with other political entities. Thus a profounder knowledge of the various factors
conditioning that process of interest development is indispensable in clarifying if, when
or to what extent policy-makers will allow considerations about their absolute
capabilities to dominate discussions on matters of supreme national import.
On that note, constructivism not only proposes to explore the social construction
of states' identities and interests, but to include the historical, ideational and contextual
influences on their appreciation of international relations as well.
42
In particular the
notion of how statesmen define themselves the scope and contents of their national
interests, i.e. in what specific areas do they primarily locate these interests (security,
wealth, territorial acquisition, etc.), provides a valuable analytical tool and interpretative
basis for examining the strategies employed by them to satisfy these needs. In
international politics, this means that states' actions may never be fully grasped without
due recognition of how the particular strategic, political, social and/or cultural context in
39
Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan and Steven C. Roach, International Relations: The Key Concepts
(London/ New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 51.
40
Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," p. 398.
41
Ian Hurd, "Constructivism," in: Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook
of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 303.
42
See in particular Weldes, "Constructing National Interests"; Finnemore, National Interests in
International Society; and Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996).
18
which they act ultimately bears upon their own views and definition of what exactly
constitutes such a national interest to begin with. More specifically, one needs to
consider that states' behaviour is, as Ian Hurd put it, "premised on their understanding of
the world around them,...their own beliefs about the world, the identities they hold
about themselves and others, and the shared understandings and practices in which they
participate."
43
Accordingly, their handling of world affairs may not be representative or
typical of a supposedly unitary state behaviour across all nations and strategic settings
as some neo-realists maintain;
44
nor is it solely a logical reaction to the competitive and
anarchical structures of the international state system.
45
Rather the framing and
implementation of their foreign-policy agenda is part of an ongoing process of
consciously re-constructing and re-inventing their national identities and interests
relative to their particular international environment. As Legro writes, states' foreign
policies are after all simultaneously "shaped by pre-existing dominant ideas and their
relationship to experienced events."
46
In that regard, constructivist emphasis on the formation of different state
identities and interests is perfectly reconcilable with the neo-realist claim that states are
power-seeking and interest-calculating entities.
47
Yet in addition, constructivists also
draw attention to how policy-makers construe themselves the sources and contents of
these interests, and this essentially not only to explain their genesis and ideational
development, but above all to illustrate "the possibility that different constructions of
states could lead to radically different types of states and patterns of state behaviour."
48
Since state interests are thus in significant part contingent on social contexts as well as
on actors' distinctive perception of defining situations, this prompts the conclusion that
neither are the strategies by which they will seek to meet and protect these
interests
i.e. through absolute or relative gainsindependent of their social
environment and the way they themselves judge these gains to impact upon their
country's over-all well-being.
49
Put differently, state interests and the methods used to
achieve them do not exist separately from the values and meanings assigned to them,
43
Hurd, "Constructivism," pp. 312-313.
44
See Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 48; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics, pp. 10-11, 17-18.
45
Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," pp. 329-334.
46
Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 4.
47
Hurd, "Constructivism," p. 310.
48
Ibid.
49
Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," p. 398.
19
but are constantly evolving and re-defined according to individuals' unique
interpretation of the geopolitical conditions surrounding them. Consequently, relative
gains might thus not by default be seen as the only approach to ensuring vital interests
and objectives, be they security, prosperity, influence or all of them at once.
1.4.
Alexander Wendt's Self-Help/Other-Help Antinomy
Regarding the problematic of absolute vs. relative advantages, one may, moreover,
also gain further valuable insights by drawing an analogy with Alexander Wendt's
discussion of the self-help/other-help-antinomy. In essence, Wendt therein contends that the
competitive self-help character of the international order is not given by nature, but man-
made as a result of process and interaction, so that it could ultimately be re-made into a less
aggressive one as well.
50
The main thrust of that position is perhaps best rendered by the
following statement:
"...self-help is not given exogenously to process....self-help and power-politics do not
follow logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help
world, this is due to process, not structure. There is no logic of anarchy apart from the
practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than
another one; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and
aggression are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of
it."
51
Self-help is thus ultimately but a product of the actions and practises developed by human
beings and, at the same time, sustained by their own definition of international anarchy.
Since the conduct of international relations is socially constructed,
52
there could accordingly
emerge other types of anarchy characterized by less frequent recourse to war and aggression
than the generally assumed "Hobbesian" one.
53
While it may prove difficult for states to
escape the pressures exerted on them by the latter, it is nevertheless not entirely
inconceivable that other forms of anarchy might at one point come to replace it, given that
50
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 183.
51
Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," pp. 394-395.
52
Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations, p. 40.
53
Wendt identifies three possible cultures of anarchy: an aggressive "Hobbesian" anarchy of intense,
near-constant enmity between states; a restricted "Lockean" anarchy of rival states exercising some self-
restraint and respecting other nations' sovereignty; and a peaceful "Kantian" anarchy in which non-
violence and mutual assistance are considered the norm in inter-state relationships. See Wendt, Social
Theory of International Politics, pp. 246-312.
Excerpt out of 74 pages
- scroll top
Details
- Quote paper
- , 2015, Absolute and Relative Gains in the American Decision to Release Nuclear Weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki: A Historical Case Study, Hamburg, Bedey Media GmbH, https://www.anchor-publishing.com/document/312805
Comments