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8
"is one manifestation of that European identity"
7
. It cannot be said that a common EU-identity
has been generated yet to the extent that it might be compared to nation-state identities;
though hitherto integration has led to profound socialization.
8
This study aims at responding to the question, to what extent popular sport can make a contri-
bution to the genesis, the implementation, and the fostering of a mutually acknowledged and
experienced EU-identity. With sports being the major social movement in Europe
9
unique in
its efficiency in bringing people together, a driving force for integration, bridging any kind of
borders and its nonpareil ubiquity its implementation on a European level targeting the Eu-
ropean Union people through popular sports will sustainably and remarkably promote the idea
of an EU-identity. As an example for a small but utterly profound project, the idea of a Euro-
pean Sports Badge (EUSB) is presented as a transnationally implementable proposal, involv-
ing and addressing EU-citizens of all nations, sexes and ages. It should be noted, though, that
sports are certainly not a panacea.
10
Measures in the domain of sport can contribute to the
establishment of an EU-identity, but they cannot stand alone and demand supporting actions
grounded in other domains.
To describe the idea on which this project is grounded, a short historical review will introduce
the topic and briefly outline actions already undertaken by the lay European Union. Secondly,
present and potential future challenges will be analyzed and thus, thirdly, lead to the explana-
tory statement why an EU-identity is necessary. As an entitative document, this study refers to
the EU White Paper on Sport. In a second step, the blueprint of a prospective EU-identity will
be developed, carving out and analyzing seven components and accounting for EU-pluralism.
It filters the most important components that are needed to construct a resistant EU-identity.
Initially, its manifoldness and its nature will be explored. Each of the seven components shall
be derived from pertinent literature. In order to not lose the essential point, the examination
will be narrowed down to the EU-identity, without trying to explain any outside factors.
Subsequently, the EUSB project will be introduced. Therefore, a differentiation between the
two main spheres of sport, professional sports and popular sports, shows that the official and
documented emphasis of the EU on the professional sphere hitherto led to negligence and a
7
Thatcher, Margaret, A Family of Nations, in: Nelsen, Brent F., Stubb, Alexander C-G. (Eds.), The European
Union, Boulder, CO 1994, p. 51.
8
Cf. Göler, Daniel, Die Grenzen des "Cost-of-Non-Europe"-Narrativs: Anmerkungen zur Sinnstiftung der Eu-
ropäischen Integration, in: integration, 2012 (2), p. 134.
9
Cf. Tokarski, Walter, Steinbach, Dirk, Spuren. Sportpolitik und Sportstrukturen in der Europäischen Union,
Aachen 2001, p. 54.
10
Cf. Dumont, Jacques, Le sport, vecteur d'intégration ? 1952, première tournée en Europe d'une équipe guade-
loupéenne, in : Villain-Gandossi, Christiane (Ed.), L'Europe à la recherche de son identité, Paris 2002, p.
459.
9
misconceiving attitude towards mass sports so far. The EUSB targets a large audience through
popular sports. The aforementioned identity blueprint will be tested by applying it to the
EUSB. Moreover, favorable side effects of the implementation of the EUSB impacting on
other domains will be presented. In a concluding step, the bare necessities of action will be
expounded, taking the results of the study into consideration. The sustainability and range of
small projects within the scope of identity policy has to be recognized and must lead to an
increased willingness to act on the part of the EU.
10
1. Mapping the road
This first section is dedicated to outlining the way the European Union has covered so far, the
analysis of potential obstacles that might appear on the way ahead and the presentation of the
White Book on Sport as an official interpretative document.
While the idea of a European society can be traced back into the 19
th
century
11
, it was only
after World War II that the European journey truly accelerated and the institutionalization of
the idea of a European entity started taking shape. Doing so, the traditional idea of national-
ism has been overcome to the benefit of "regional cooperation"
12
on a European level; simul-
taneously fostering integration.
13
Two major positions sprouted: On the one hand, federalists
held the view that the idea of nation states would be neutralized as the result of a dynamic
integration, on the other hand, traditionalists were convinced that the compromises would not
go beyond the economic domain.
14
As we know today, the traditionalists' position has been
devitalized. At the same time, the federalists' view has not reached its true potential either.
After the end of World War II and the subsequent re-organization of the European continent,
the end of the Cold War is the decisive marker on the road. The end of the bipolar world ruled
off the old benchmarks and heralded a new era.
15
Not only did the European Community have
to re-define its position in the new world order, it also had to find a way to justify its role. The
resultant globalization process forced scholars in the domain of International Relations to shift
the perspective from a nation-state dominated one
16
, since the European Union is "a political
experiment in taking the civilizing process beyond the nation state"
17
. The political unifica-
tion of Europe is being performed on a rational level since lasting peace can only be realized
by finding answers to blazing political conflicts
18
and leads to the dissolution of separating
structures.
19
However, there has never been a concrete plan or "some eternal core idea"
20
on
11
Cf. Schäfers, Bernhard, Sozialstruktur und sozialer Wandel in Deutschland, Stuttgart 2002, p. 311.
12
McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union, p. 25.
13
Cf. Schmale, Wolfgang, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität, Bonn 2010, p. 182.
14
Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Weidenfeld,
Werner (Ed.), Die Identität Europas, München 1985, p. 87.
15
Cf. Kutz, Martin, Zentrum und Peripherie, oder: Über den Zusammenhang von kultureller und wirtschaftli-
cher Dynamik Europas in Geschichte und Gegenwart, in: Kutz, Martin, Weyland, Petra (Eds.), Europäische
Identität? Versuch, kulturelle Aspekte eines Phantoms zu beschreiben, Bremen 2000, p. 178.
16
Cf. Take, Ingo, Weltgesellschaft und Globalisierung, in: Schieder, Siegfried, Spindler Manuela (Eds.), Theo-
rien der Internationalen Beziehungen, Opladen 2010, p. 284.
17
Linklater, Andrew, A European Civilizing Process, in: Hill, Christopher, Smith, Michael (Eds.), Internation-
al Relations and the European Union, New York, NY 2005, p. 376.
18
Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 82.
19
Cf. Weidenfeld, Werner, Europa im Umbruch: Perspektiven einer neuen Ordnung des Kontinents, in: Wei-
denfeld, Werner, Stützle, Walther (Ed.), Abschied von der alten Ordnung: Europas neue Sicherheit, Güters-
loh 1990, p. 7.
11
which the concept of Europe is based
21
, no guiding roadmap. The one intention that was ob-
vious was the political unification
22
. In order to make this vision come true, institutions like
the progressive implementation of an economic union, a monetary union and a common mar-
ket were of utmost importance.
23
Although the European Union and its political leaders have "not yet succeeded in crafting a
common European sense of `who we are'"
24
in defining an EU-identity for the people in the
European Union member states, it is by far not too late. As stated before, the project of the
European Union is a one-of-a-kind experiment; there is no existing comparable transnational
structure. John F. Kennedy, a non-European, phrased it as follows: "Those who dare to fail
miserably can achieve greatly." No one knows what lies ahead, but one has to dare, one has to
have the courage to act and to foster movement. The development of the European Union
could be regarded as moving at a snail's pace
25
, but yet it is important to acknowledge that
despite its pace, it is moving constantly forward.
a. What happened so far
This brief discussion of the road the European Union has taken so far will predominantly fo-
cus on main events after the end of World War II. Nonetheless it is important to note that Eu-
ropean civil societies of the 19
th
century already aligned themselves to the elements of peace,
the rule of law and democracy and openly spoke their mind.
26
Revolutions in many European
countries, aiming at establishing a constitution, demanding the right to participate, and asking
for civil rights to be legally acknowledged may illustrate this fact.
The European continent has suffered from wars and national hatred for centuries; it was far
from being a singular entity in any way until the beginning of the 20
th
century. After World
War I, a primary stage of a pacifistic European idealism grew out of the rubble.
27
"[B]ereft of
20
Wæver, Ole, Kelstrup, Morten, Europe and its nations, p. 65.
21
The five main fragments in the dominant discourses on Europe were: the role of Europe as a geographical
concept, the concept of liberty, Europe as Christendom, the balance of power and European civilization, cf.
ibid.
22
Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 81.
23
Cf. ibid., pp. 93 f.
24
Checkel, Jeffrey T., Katzenstein, Peter J., The politicization of European identities, in: Checkel, Jeffrey T.,
Katzenstein, Peter J. (Eds.), European Identity, Cambridge 2009, p. 1.
25
Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 109.
26
Cf. Schmale, Wolfgang, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität, p. 103.
27
Cf. Szyszko, Agata, Die kulturelle Identität Europas als ideen- und begriffsgeschichtliches Konzept, in: Birk,
Eberhard (Ed.), Aspekte einer europäischen Identität, Fürstenfeldbruck 2004, p. 16.
12
a firm psychological basis"
28
and under the Nazi-occupation of Europe, the merits of the idea
of Europe became ambiguous though.
29
Ravaged by war and destruction, bemoaning the loss
of millions of people and economically devastated, Europe experienced its zero hour in the
aftermath of World War II. The founding fathers of the European unification primarily initiat-
ed this project in order to restore peace in Europe
30
and "to eradicate unnecessary suffering
from Western Europe whether caused by interstate war or by economic collapse"
31
. However,
the occupying powers, namely the United States of America and the Soviet Union, were not
interested in fostering an independent Europe
32
and aimed at a restoration on a nation-state
level instead.
33
Given the amount of challenging tasks, the European national governments'
point of interest was their own country at first, not the seminal ideas of Europe.
34
It was im-
perative to rebuild entire nations, including their societies, their economy, their political struc-
ture and their international relations, too. In this environment, considerable courage and dedi-
cation was needed to achieve a European unification
35
, given the tremendous dimension of
fragmentation and devastation.
One first step to foster closer cooperation and interaction took place in Geneva in 1947 when
the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE or ECE) was founded
36
. It
was the first supraregional sub-organization of the United Nations. Just one year later, 18 Eu-
ropean states joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
37
In the
very same year, the Hague Congress took place. It was the first meeting of such a kind, pre-
sided over by former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in which some 800 politicians
of Western European countries came together to explore future framework requirements of a
unified Europe.
38
Simultaneously launched, the Marshall Plan contributed much to the Euro-
pean unifying process in the economic sphere even though it should be noted that the US
was in a position to impose more pressure which could have resulted in the creation of a
common European political structure.
39
28
Checkel, Jeffrey T., Katzenstein, Peter J., The politicization of European identities, p. 4.
29
Cf. Schäfers, Bernhard, Sozialstruktur und sozialer Wandel in Deutschland, p. 296.
30
Cf. Westerwelle, Guido, Der Wert Europas, p. 91.
31
Linklater, Andrew, A European Civilising Process, p. 376.
32
Cf. Gruner, Wolf D., Woyke, Wichard, Europa-Lexikon. Länder Politik Institutionen, München 2004, p.
42.
33
Cf. ibid.
34
Cf. ibid., pp. 42 f.
35
Cf. Szyszko, Agata, Die kulturelle Identität Europas als ideen- und begriffsgeschichtliches Konzept, p. 16.
36
Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 83.
37
Cf. ibid.
38
Cf. Hick, Alan, Die Europäische Bewegung, in: Loth, Wilfried (Ed.), Die Anfänge der Europäischen Integra-
tion 1945-1950, Bonn 1990, p. 241.
39
Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 84.
13
The next decisive step was the Schuman Declaration of May 9
th
1950
40
. French Foreign Min-
ister Robert Schuman proposed the establishment of a community working supranationally,
organizing coal and steel industries in France, Germany and other European countries willing
to join.
41
His forward-looking plan was implemented through the foundations of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Treaty of Paris.
42
In the field of military unifica-
tion, the treaty of a European Defense Community (EDC), based on a proposal by René Plev-
en, then-French Prime Minister regarding a pan-European defense force, was signed on May
27
th
1952 by the members of the ECSC
43
, but the French Parliament denied its ratification.
Thus, the idea of the EDC was never realized. With the Treaty of Rome (the Treaty establish-
ing the European Economic Community), signed on May 25
th
1957, the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM)
were founded.
44
The division of Germany and the iron curtain, an ideological as well as a physical boundary,
led to a separation between Western and Eastern Europe in a hitherto unknown intensity.
45
The bipolarity between the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact on the one hand and the European
Community and NATO member states on the other hand, as well as the subsequent political,
economic, military and social tensions made history. The Cold War dominated the second
half of the 20
th
century. But it also
"gave way to debate in terms of Europe"
46
due to the geo-
graphical closeness and the gradually defining of the European Community's role. With the
reunification of Germany in 1989 and the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, Europe witnessed "a
historic turning point in [its] history"
47
. From then on, its actions were no longer reactive, but
started showing constructive and forming traits
48
, giving a hand to
"
post-socialist societies
which were struggling to achieve economic prosperity and political stability"
49
. Thus, a multi-
tude of new EU member states' incentives to join the EU was initially based upon mere eco-
nomic calculations rather than on the founding ideas of the post-World War II momentum.
50
The Maastricht Treaty, signed on February 7
th
, 1992, legally avouched the four great free-
40
This date is regarded as the hour of birth of the EU and is celebrated as the Europe Day since 1986, commem-
orating Schumans far-reaching idea and speech.
41
Cf. Janz, Louis, Die Geschichte der europäischen Einigung nach den Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 86.
42
Cf. ibid., p. 89.
43
Cf. ibid., pp. 89 f.
44
Cf. ibid., p. 93.
45
Cf. ibid., p. 80.
46
Wæver, Ole, Kelstrup, Morten, Europe and its nations, p. 64.
47
Weidendfeld, Werner, Janning, Josef, After 1989: The Emerge of a new Europe, in: Weidendfeld, Werner,
Janning, Josef (Eds.), Global Responsibilities: Europe in Tomorrow's World, Gütersloh 1991, p. 12.
48
Cf. Wæver, Ole, Kelstrup, Morten, Europe and its nations, p. 64.
49
Linklater, Andrew, A European Civilizing Process, p. 368.
50
Cf. Kielmannsegg, Peter Graf, Integration und Demokratie, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus, Kohler-Koch, Beate
(Eds.), Europäische Integration, Opladen 2003, p. 50.
14
doms (freedom of trade, passenger traffic, services and capital) and presented the Three Pil-
lars of the European Union.
51
With the Lisbon Treaty, signed on December 13
th
, 2007, which
adopted, with regard to contents, the 2005 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, the
EU now has a constitution-like legal framework. Even today, no proper term has been found
to describe the political nature of the EU which makes it one of a kind, "sui generis"
52
.
The face of Europe has changed remarkably over the last five decades. Never has this conti-
nent seen a comparable era of peace, stability, prosperity and harmony. The number of its
member states has more than quadruplicated since the foundation of the ECSC. Given its con-
stant advancements and adjustments to internal and external requirements, the EU today is
"clearly far more than a conventional international organization"
53
. Forging a common desti-
ny
54
on various levels, the EU has developed far beyond mere economic integration tradition-
alists envisioned.
b. Analyzing present and potential future challenges for the EU
A united Europe is anticipated to be the best possible solution to prepare its member states for
present and future challenges
55
through sustainable and stabilizing politics. For centuries,
"Western Europeans have devoted a great deal of energy to killing each other"
56
instead of
cooperating and showing solidarity with neighboring countries. Owing to the economical,
political and social unification expedited by the EU, military conflicts among member states
have become almost unimaginable.
57
The EU represents the longest period of peace and sta-
bility ever experienced on European soil. Thus, potential threats are hardly expected to come
from other member states since "threat makes us choose sides"
58
. Due to historical experienc-
es, the EU prevented various dangers of all kinds so far. Referring to neofunctionalism, en-
dogenous preferences and spillover effects foster appropriate developments.
59
51
Cf. Hänsch, Klaus, Perspektiven der europäischen Integration, in: Leiße, Olaf (Ed.), Die Europäische Union
nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon, Wiesbaden 2010, p. 70.
52
McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union, p. 22.
53
Ibid.
54
Cf. Weidenfeld, Werner, Turek, Jürgen, Wie Zukunft entsteht, p. 178.
55
Cf. Westerwelle, Guido, Der Wert Europas, p. 90.
56
Calhoun, Craig, The Virtues of Inconsistency: Identity and Plurality in the Conceptualization of Europe, in:
Cederman, Lars-Erik (Ed.), Constructing Europe's Identity. The external dimension, Boulder, CO 2001, p.
37.
57
Cf. Weidenfeld, Werner, Turek, Jürgen, Wie Zukunft entsteht, p. 178.
58
Checkel, Jeffrey T., Katzenstein, Peter J., Conclusion European identity in context, in: Checkel, Jeffrey T.,
Katzenstein, Peter J. (Eds.), European Identity, Cambridge 2009, p. 214.
59
Cf. Schimmelpfennig, Frank, Zwischen Neo- und Postfunktionalismus: Die Integrationstheorien und die
Eurokrise, in: Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift, 2012 (3), p. 395.
15
In order to analyze present and potential future challenges for the EU, one has to classify
them first. So there will be a selection of (1) internal EU-issues, (2) threats coming from other
countries and (3) ecological factors.
First and foremost, the cleavage between the EU-citizens and the proceeding European concil-
iation does not stop increasing.
60
Due to the continuous lack of legitimacy and democracy
61
,
the EU-citizens feel neither represented nor personally addressed. Therefore, many of them
have developed an indifferent attitude towards European polity.
62
Decisions made in Brus-
sels, regarding more and more aspects of everyday life, are often perceived as burdens.
63
Par-
ticularly when it comes to mere cost-benefit calculations
64
, donor EU member states weight
their own contributions against what they might receive or be given back by member states
that are supported. As there is no stable nor acknowledged EU-identity, transnational solidari-
ty is remarkably low.
65
Since 2008, when the economic crisis started spreading globally, the
EU had to learn what solidarity among member states really means. National debt crises of
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Italy burdened and even exhausted the intra-European
relations sustainably and there is still no end in sight.
66
The economic strength and success of
the EU has been the most appealing argument in the course of the European unification
67
but
being equitable partners collaborating in an economic system
68
makes demands on both sides.
Given the distinctly diverse levels of economic power, some states claimed economic aid
69
in
order to be given a chance to catch up with the economic locomotives of the EU. Due to tradi-
tional rivalries and stereotypes
70
, friction among member states will likely prove a roadblock
to success, and will have to be dealt with in the future.
Another component of the crucial test the EU is currently facing, as well as the issue it will
have to confront in the future, is the multitude of cultures that exist within Europe. In some
cases, the reach of a culture does not even match the geographical borders
71
. Indeed, thinking
60
Cf. Hänsch, Klaus, Perspektiven der europäischen Integration, p. 69.
61
Cf. Kielmannsegg, Peter Graf, Integration und Demokratie, p. 53.
62
Cf. Meyer, Thomas, Die Identität Europas, Frankfurt/Main 2004, p. 10.
63
Cf. Kielmannsegg, Peter Graf, Integration und Demokratie, p. 51.
64
Cf. Göler, Daniel, Die Grenzen des "Cost-of-Non-Europe"-Narrativs: Anmerkungen zur Sinnstiftung der
Europäischen Integration, in: integration, 2012 (2), p. 132.
65
Cf. Schimmelpfennig, Frank, Zwischen Neo- und Postfunktionalismus, p. 396.
66
Cf. Schimmelpfennig, Frank, Zwischen Neo- und Postfunktionalismus, p. 394.
67
Cf. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz, Fragen zu Großeuropa, in: Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz (Eds.), Auf dem Weg
nach Europa Fragen zur europäischen Integration, Köln 1991, p. 6.
68
Cf. Berting, Jan, Braak, Hans van de, L'identité culturelle de la »Grande Europe« : mythe ou réalité, in :
Viallain-Gandossi, Christiane, Bochmann, Klaus, Metzeltin, Michel, Schäffner, Christina (Eds.), Le con-
cept de l'Europe dans le processus de la CSCE, Tübingen 1990, p. 35.
69
Cf. Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ignaz, Fragen zu Großeuropa, p. 6.
70
Cf. McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union, p. 32.
71
Cf. Berting, Jan, Braak, Hans van de, L'identité culturelle de la »Grande Europe«, p. 35.
16
within the limits of nations restrains European integration. Nationalism must be countered to
allow Europe to become "a place where institutional arrangements foster a plurality of identi-
ties"
72
. In the same vein, the EU also has to foster a sustainable integration of Central Europe-
an countries that are "no longer allies of the USSR, nor are they members of NATO, nor are
they formally neutral, nor are they organized regionally in security terms"
73
. Finding a satisfy-
ing and wise solution in this domain is imperative and demands a constructive and positive
dialogue among all member states.
Furthermore, the EU shoulders great responsibilities. Due to its economic and political influ-
ence, it is dealing with "new and global responsibilities"
74
, e.g. humanitarian aid and devel-
opment assistance and even beyond EU-borders, when it comes to foreign and security poli-
cy
75
.
Referring to the second sort of challenges threats coming from other countries the ques-
tion of migration
76
will undoubtedly be one of the most urgent ones. It is "a major political
question and [...] the subject of turbulent debates in the public sphere"
77
where "major politi-
cal actors [agree on] a more restrictive, control-oriented approach."
78
With plenty of immi-
grants, may they be "prompted by conflict, the fear of repression or just sheer lack of
hope."
79
, Ultimately, it should be said, Western European countries fear a further crisis of
their national identities.
80
Apart from migration, the rise of newly industrializing countries and an immense growth of
population China, India and Brazil
81
create profound changes in the economic and politi-
cal world order.
82
The EU has to define and to defend its position in order to remain meaning-
72
Calhoun, Craig, The Virtues of Inconsistency, p. 53.
73
Heisbourg, François, Restructuring European Security, in: Weidendfeld, Werner, Janning, Josef (Eds.),
Global Responsibilities: Europe in Tomorrow's World, Gütersloh 1991, p. 101.
74
Weidendfeld, Werner, Janning, Josef, After 1989: The Emerge of a new Europe, p. 12.
75
Cf. Westerwelle, Guido, Der Wert Europas, p. 91.
76
"In the context of the EU, cultural readings of migration emerge in relation to three themes. The first is the
cultural (and possibly racial) significance of border controls and limitations of free movement. The second is
the question of integration or assimilation of migrants into the domestic societies of the member states. The
third is the relationship between European integration and the development of multicultural societies" in:
Huysmans, Jef, European Identity and Migration Policies, in: Cederman, Lars-Erik (Ed.), Constructing Eu-
rope's Identity. The external dimension, Boulder, CO 2001, p. 198.
77
Ibid., p. 189.
78
Ibid.
79
Heisbourg, François, Restructuring European Security, p. 98.
80
Cf. Mitchell, Mark, Russell, Dave, Immigration, citizenship and the nation-state in the new Europe, in: Jen-
kins, Brian, Spyros, A. Sofos (Eds.), Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe, London 1996, p. 73.
81
Cf. Hänsch, Klaus, Perspektiven der europäischen Integration, p. 75.
82
Cf. Westerwelle, Guido, Der Wert Europas, p. 90.
17
ful. Acting individually, no European nation would truly be in a position to negotiate with
global enterprises or global powers.
83
Finally, one must return to the matter of responsibilities. Although environmental effects do
not affect only specific countries but are experienced globally, its political strength and its
state of the art of science and technology oblige the EU to take measures for the protection of
the environment
84
and the handling of climate change.
85
In order to preserve the world for
future generations, the EU has to set an example and implement international standards
through its environmental policy.
Recapitulatory, the amount of challenges for the EU in various areas are manifold. But the EU
has proven itself flexible and adaptive so far, since its entire history can be seen as a learning
process.
86
Europe has never been an exclusively European topic
87
nor will it ever be due to its
global interconnectedness on all levels. The EU's uncontested strength in facing these chal-
lenges is rooted in its inner plurality.
88
c. Together we stand, divided we fall: Expounding the necessity of a mutu-
ally acknowledged EU-identity
Taking into consideration the supremely favorable development of the EU and its powerful
position in the world today, why would there be a need for a mutually acknowledged identity?
There has not been an EU-identity so far and still the Union stands tall. But as in everyday
life, the true stability of relations is revealed in times of crises. Given the ongoing financial
crisis and the challenges that are in the offing, the lack of an EU-identity, shared by the EU-
citizens, is precarious. EU-internal debates are no longer exercised on a professional and ra-
tional level, but emotional and biased towards old antagonisms.
As mentioned before, the European continent has never witnessed a similarly long phase of
peace so far: Since 1945, there has been no armed conflict amongst the member states of the
EU.
89
Due to legal, political and economic interdependencies
90
, the EU succeeded in pacify-
ing a multitude of former belligerent countries. Howbeit "nation-states have become since the
83
Cf. Hänsch, Klaus, Perspektiven der europäischen Integration, p. 75.
84
Cf. Berting, Jan, Braak, Hans van de, L'identité culturelle de la "Grande Europe", p. 43.
85
Cf. Hänsch, Klaus, Perspektiven der europäischen Integration, p. 69.
86
Cf. Kohlhase, Norbert, Strategien der Europapolitik, in: Weidenfeld, Werner (Eds.), Die Identität Europas,
München 1985, p. 263.
87
Cf. Muschg, Adolf, Was ist europäisch ?, Bonn 2005, p. 15.
88
Cf. Szyszko, Agata, Die kulturelle Identität Europas als ideen- und begriffsgeschichtliches Konzept, p. 22.
89
Cf. Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, Sanftes Monster Brüssel oder die Entmündigung Europas, Berlin 2011, p. 7.
90
Cf. Kohlhase, Norbert, Strategien der Europapolitik, p. 257.
18
last century the natural political form"
91
, the EU member states are endowed with a shared
inheritance.
92
Never before was the continent likewise thrice blessed with wealth, rights, and
perspectives
93
like these days. In order to enshrine these achievements, the EU has to "search
for an essence"
94
. It must define its illusions, goals, and objectives so as to create a normative
identity.
95
With integration being the exclusive alternative
96
, the EU has to recollect its supranational
97
identity markers and envisage a reflection "in public debate"
98
Only by starting from the citi-
zen's level, self-determination on a global level
99
can be successful. A legitimate and demo-
cratic imprint is indispensable if a political identity
100
is supposed to emphasize membership
and the willingness to participate.
Consequently, the EU has to foster the genesis of an EU-identity that is mutually acknowl-
edged to override internal friction, to rekindle European solidarity again, and to define its po-
sition in the world in the future. Europe, more specifically the EU, can only survive united. To
visualize the situation, one can imagine the individual countries of the EU as young trees. If a
tress is located alone, there is no protection from any side. Wind, rain, snow, and further kinds
of weather harry it without hindrance. It is solely in a group of trees a copse or a forest
where stronger and more resistant trees give shelter to smaller ones and render their growth
possible. They are rooted in the same earth and are bathed in the same sunlight. Yet every tree
is an individual and always will be.
d. The EU White Paper on Sport
The Treaty of Rome did not mention sport in any way
101
. This neglectful treatment on the
level of governance lasted until 1985, the Milan European Summit. The EC Council of Minis-
91
Jacobs, Dirk, Maier, Robert, European Identity: construct, fact, fiction, in: Gastelaars, Marja, Ruijter, Arie
de (Eds.), A United Europe. The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity, Maastricht 1998, p. 17.
92
Cf. Berting, Jan, Braak, Hans van de, L'identité culturelle de la "Grande Europe", p. 45.
93
Cf. Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, Verhofstadt, Guy, Für Europa! Ein Manifest, Antwerpen 2012, p. 11.
94
Bifulco, Marco, In search of an identity for Europe, Bonn 1998, p. 3.
95
Cf. Schmale, Wolfgang, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität, p. 131.
96
Cf. Hollaschke, Gerhard, Die EG-Integration zwischen Anpassung und Veränderung. Demokratietheoretische
Überlegungen und institutionelle Reformen, in: Strübel, Michael (Ed.), Wohin treibt Europa? Der EG-
Binnenmarkt und das Gemeinsame Europäische Haus, Marburg 1990, p. 56.
97
Cf. Szyszko, Agata, Die kulturelle Identität Europas als ideen- und begriffsgeschichtliches Konzept, p. 22.
98
Checkel, Jeffrey T., Katzenstein, Peter J., The politicization of European identities, p. 4.
99
Cf. Szyszko, Agata, Die kulturelle Identität Europas als ideen- und begriffsgeschichtliches Konzept, p. 11.
100
Cf. Meyer, Thomas, Die Identität Europas, p. 21.
101
Cf. Tokarski, Walter, Europa in Bewegung Der Sport im ,,Europa der Bürger" gewinnt Konturen, in: To-
karski, Walter, Petry, Karen, Schulz, Norbert (Eds.), Brennpunkte der Sportwissenschaft. Sport im ,,Europa
19
ters decided to use sport as an instrument for communication and public relations.
102
Thus, the
Adonnino Report highlighted the fact that sport is a preeminent medium to tighten the EC-
citizens' sense of belonging to the European Community.
103
With the foundation of the Euro-
pean Sports Forum in 1991
104
the European Commission acted on the suggestion of the Euro-
pean Olympic Committee (EOC).
105
In this vein, various sports associations of EU member
states were given the chance to communicate. Until the Treaty of Lisbon, the role of sports
has been increasingly carved out in various documents and treaties.
106
With the Treaty of Lis-
bon sport has been legally pinned individually in an EU-treaty for the first time.
107
Thus, the
EU can refer to a legal basis in order to support member states on the domain of sport
108
since
a defined EU competence has been introduced. Due to the enhanced competences, the Direc-
torate-General Education and Culture of the European Commission
109
(DG EAC) is being
regarded more highly.
110
Within the EU, questions on sports are dealt within DG EAC; moreover the European Parlia-
ment runs a Committee
responsible for education, culture, youth, sport and the cultural and
educational aspects of the EU's media policy.
111
The EU White Paper on Sport is the first document on the level of the EU formulating clear
objectives.
112
Containing recommendations for future European policies and propounding
strategies how sports can be embedded in various political domains, it was presented on July
11
th
, 2007 by the European Commission.
113
Despite the small volume of only 21 pages, its
der Bürger". Neue Beiträge zum Zusammenwachsen des Sports im Europäischen Binnenmarkt, 1994 (1), p.
5.
102
Cf. Danckert, Peter, Kraftmaschine Parlament. Der Sportausschuss und die Sportpolitik des Bundes, Aachen
2009, p. 230.
103
Cf. Kepper, Christophe de, Die Europäische Union und der Sport, in: Schimke, Martin (Ed.), Sport in der
Europäischen Union, Heidelberg 1996, p. 4.
104
Cf. Kepper, Christophe de, Die Europäische Union und der Sport, p. 5.
105
Cf. Tokarski, Walter, Steinbach, Dirk, Spuren. Sportpolitik und Sportstrukturen in der Europäischen Union,
p. 56.
106
E.g. The EU member states agreed on paying more regard to sports in the Amsterdam Treaty. In the Treaty of
Nice, they stressed the social and cultural values of sport. Neither of the treaties was legally binding though,
cf.
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/index_en.htm
and
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/pdf/12001C_EN.pdf
107
Singer, Otto, Sportpolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Lissabon-Vertrag,
http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/analysen/2010/Sportpolitik_EU.pdf
, p. 3.
108
Ibid., p. 11.
109
Cf. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/
110
Singer, Otto, Sportpolitik der Europäischen Union nach dem Lissabon-Vertrag, p. 13.
111
Cf. Tokarski, Walter, Steinbach, Dirk, Spuren. Sportpolitik und Sportstrukturen in der Europäischen Union,
p. 56.
112
Cf. Danckert, Peter, Kraftmaschine Parlament, p. 238.
113
Cf. ibid., p. 237.
20
tripartite
114
structure is strategically clear and it extensively
115
analyses all possible spheres of
sports.
116
The White Paper on Sport comes with three accompanying documents: The action
plan Pierre de Coubertin
117
, the Commission Staff Working Document Background and Con-
text and the Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment.
118
Hence, the White
Paper on Sport can be seen as a guideline for sport-related projects in the coming years. De-
spite the cross-border effects and the internationality of sport
119
, this document "
shows a Eu-
ropean Commission that is aware of its limitations to intervene in the sports sector"
120
since it
has to respect national sports associations' sovereignty. Owing to the interdependencies of
professional sport and the economic sector, the sector of popular sports is hardly ever men-
tioned. The emphasis of the White Paper is clearly on professional sport, based on the well-
known potentials of sport in general.
In summary, the White Paper on Sport can be regarded as the most comprehensive and vi-
sionary document on sport produced so far by the EU. It reveals that many problems of sports
(e.g. doping, gambling, etc.) can be solved on the level of the EU only.
121
Despite the "rela-
tively new"
122
interest in sport governance, the extent and the impact of upcoming actions
based on this document can be expected to be profound.
114
The societal role of sport, the economic dimension of sport and the organization of sport, cf. Europäische
Kommission, Mitteilung zum Sport (2011). Entwicklung der europäischen Dimension des Sports, Brüssel
2011, p. 3 f.
115
Cf. Danckert, Peter, Kraftmaschine Parlament, p. 238.
116
The White Paper on Sport appreciates the societal role of sports, defines the role of sport in education and
training, fosters the promotion of volunteering, takes side effects like integration and the fight against racism
into consideration, explores the economic dimension of sport, acknowledges the organization of sport - pri-
marily professional sports and drafts follow-up measures.
117
In this document, the measures mentioned in the White Paper on Sport are embodied. The action plan con-
tains 53 concrete sport-related suggestions that intend to guide the European Commission's sport policy in
the upcoming years.
118
Cf. Danckert, Peter, Kraftmaschine Parlament, p. 237.
119
Cf. Hansen, Hans, Europa wächst zusammen, in: Rydzy-Götz, Marlis (Ed.), Die Europäische Gemeinschaft
und der Sport, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, p. 3.
120
García, Borja, The Governance of European Sport, in: Dine, Philip, Crosson, Seán (Eds.), Sport, Represen-
tation and Evolving Identities in Europe, Oxford 2010, p. 47.
121
Cf. Danckert, Peter, Kraftmaschine Parlament, p. 240.
122
García, Borja, The Governance of European Sport, p. 29.
21
2. The European Union and its prospective identity
a. One multifaceted EU-identity
Referring to the prevailing view, it can be said that there is "no stable core, no given Europe-
an identity"
123
which would be perceived by Europeans.
124
In order to specify the term of
identity in this study, one has to draw a line between a European identity in general and the
EU-identity in particular. To what extent are these two identities synonymous
125
? What as-
pects cause a differentiation? Bruter
126
points out that the definition of the terms of perception
of Europe is decisive. He contrasts a cultural point of view from a political one.
127
This in-
formation enables politicians to develop specifically tailored governance projects in order to
foster the genesis of an EU-identity. The EU is predominantly experienced as a "political,
value and economic community"
128
and as a "political entity based on universal values"
129
.
This knowledge challenges politicians in finding an appropriate answer to the question of
what kind of EU-identity should be generated
130
what are its basic contents?
This second section aims at developing a solid blueprint of a potential EU-identity, taking into
consideration that the EU is a political system sui generis
131
and so will be its identity, viz.
one cannot simply copy some national identity. Apart from that, the hereby developed EU-
identity does not aim as replacing traditional national identities of EU member states.
132
With the extensive use of the term identity in everyday language, its scientific expression has
become rather diffuse and polysemous.
133
Identity is not predetermined possession, but it
means the social process
134
of self-definition of individuals or groups, based on a mutually
accepted embodiment of values
135
. Moreover, it is defined by inclusionary and exclusionary
schemes.
136
Yet another distinction has to be made "between the subjects and the objects of
123
Wæver, Ole, Kelstrup, Morten, Europe and its nations: political and cultural identities, p. 65.
124
Cf. Kielmannsegg, Peter Graf, Integration und Demokratie, p. 57.
125
Cf. Risse, Thomas, A Community of Europeans?, p. 50.
126
Cf. Bruter, Michael, Citizens of Europe?
127
`Culture' in this understanding encompasses history, ethnicity, civilization, heritage, and other social similari-
ties. `Political identity' instead is more circumscribed and refers to the identification of citizens with particu-
lar political institutions such as the EU, cf. Risse, Thomas, A Community of Europeans?, p. 50.
128
Ibid.
129
Ibid., p. 51.
130
Cf. Datler, Georg, Europäische Identität jenseits der Demos-Fiktion, p. 59.
131
Cf. Hix, Simon, The Study of the European Community, p. 324.
132
Cf. Wagner, Hartmut, Bezugspunkte europäischer Identität, p. 13.
133
Stelter, Reinhard, Du bist wie dein Sport, p. 19.
134
Cf. Meyer, Thomas, Die Identität Europas, p. 24.
135
Cf. Czarny, Raphaël, Existe-t-il une identité européenne ?
136
Cf. Schmale, Wolfgang, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität, p. 37.
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